Did the financial crisis in 2007-2008 spread from distressed banks to households through a contraction of the credit supply? We study this question with a dataset that contains observations on all accounts in Danish banks as well as comprehensive information about individual account holders and banks. We document that banks exposed to the financial crisis reduced their lending relative to non-exposed banks, which in turn caused a significant decrease in the borrowing and spending of their customers. The effects were persistent: borrowing remained lower through the post-crisis years and spending foregone during the crisis was not recovered. * We thank
Introduction
The global banking crisis in 2007-2008 was followed by the Great Recession where corporate investment, employment and household consumption fell sharply in virtually all developed countries. This pattern of a financial bust followed by a severe contraction of the real economy has played out numerous times over the last centuries (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009) .
A central question faced by economists trying to grasp the dynamics of the Great Recession is whether the crisis in the banking sector was transmitted to the real economy through a reduction in credit supply. The tightening of credit by banks in financial distress is one among several possible explanations why firms stopped investing and households slashed consumption in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Understanding the strength of this transmission mechanism is important for guiding policy responses to future crises. To the extent that tightened credit is responsible for the transmission to the real economy, it may be possible to contain a financial crisis by securing credit to the firms and households served by banks in distress.
This paper explores how the financial crisis in 2007-2008 affected the borrowing and consumption of households through the credit supply channel. Our laboratory is Denmark where households, like in the U.S. and many other advanced economies, are highly levered and thus depend strongly on credit to sustain consumption.
We exploit a unique dataset from the Danish tax authorities, which contains information about the balance of all loan accounts in Danish financial institutions for the period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] , and add comprehensive information about account holders from administrative records as well as balance sheet information about banks. We can thus track the borrowing of households in each bank and assess the extent to which they reduced total borrowing or compensated with borrowing from other banks when their existing bank tightened credit. We can also estimate the effects on real estate and automobile choices as well as total spending imputed from income and wealth information (Browning & Leth-Petersen, 2003) .
Our empirical strategy exploits that the financial crisis in 2007-2008 affected Danish banks differentially depending on the structure of their balance sheet. While the origin of the crisis was losses on US mortgage-backed securities, it spread within the banking sector through the markets for short-term funding (Brunnermeier, 2009; Shin, 2009; Gorton & Metrick, 2012) . Danish banks generally had limited direct exposure to US mortgage-backed securities (Rangvid, 2013) , however, those that relied heavily on wholesale funding experienced a severe liquidity shock when funding markets froze in 2008. Hence, the financial crisis plausibly induced a differential credit supply shock to Danish households because banks with a stable funding base and relatively liquid assets were able to continue lending as before, whereas banks with an unstable funding base and relatively illiquid assets were forced to reduce their lending.
Based on these considerations, we measure a bank's exposure to the financial crisis as the ratio of loans to deposits in 2007 where the denominator reflects relatively illiquid assets and the denominator reflects relatively stable funding. We provide two types of evidence that banks with more exposure reduced their supply of credit relative to banks with less exposure. First, in a simple bank-level analysis, we show that more exposure was associated with a significantly larger decrease in lending over the period [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] . This finding mirrors existing studies of lending dynamics during the financial crisis (Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010; Cornett et al., 2011) and is clearly consistent with a differential tightening of the credit supply. Second, in the subsample of individuals with loan accounts in multiple banks, we conduct a conceptually similar exercise at the account-level. With credit demand shocks being fully absorbed by individual-time fixed effects, our finding that banks with more exposure reduced lending during the financial crisis relative to banks with less exposure must derive from a differential change in the credit supply (Khwaja & Mian, 2008) .
In the main analysis, we exploit this variation in the credit supply to identify how the financial crisis affected households through the credit supply channel. We match each individual with their primary bank in 2007 and ask whether customers in banks that were more exposed to the imminent financial crisis fared worse through the crisis and post-crisis period in terms of credit and consumption. Specifically, we compare the outcomes of customers in banks with above-median exposure ("exposed banks") to the outcomes of customers in banks with below-median exposure ("non-exposed banks"). This difference-in-difference estimator identifies the direct effect of the credit supply shock on customers in exposed banks, but not the general equilibrium effects that are likely to be similar for customers in all banks.
The key challenge for identification is that banks' exposure to the financial crisis may conceivably correlate with the credit demand of their customers. Such a correlation could arise if exposed banks were also characterized by other imprudent business practices such as low credit standards and lax monitoring of borrowers. This could cause selection into exposed banks by inherently impatient individuals who borrowed beyond their means before the crisis and thus demanded less credit after the crisis. In this example, simply comparing the credit outcomes of customers in exposed and nonexposed banks would conflate demand and supply factors and therefore not correctly identify the credit supply channel.
We address this identification issue in various ways. First, we show that the observable characteristics of customers in exposed and non-exposed banks are virtually identical. Seemingly, the two types of banks served the same household segments at the eve of the crisis suggesting that they were exposed to the same demand shocks. Second, our model eliminates several confounding factors by including individual fixed effects as well as a comprehensive set of pre-crisis individual characteristics interacted with time dummies. For instance, non-parametric controls for the pre-crisis distribution of debt interacted with time dummies effectively control for differential credit demand shocks arising from differences in pre-crisis leverage (Dynan et al., 2012) . In a similar way, we eliminate credit demand shocks arising from differences in municipality, industry, income, age, education and so on. Third, we show that pre-crisis trends in outcomes are parallel across individuals whose banks were exposed differently to the crisis. This strengthens the case that also unobservable individual characteristics affecting credit demand are uncorrelated with bank exposure.
The first set of results provides strong evidence that the financial crisis reduced household borrowing through the credit supply channel. The total debt of customers in exposed banks decreased by around DKK 12,000 (USD 2,000) relative to customers in non-exposed banks over the period [2008] [2009] and this difference persisted through the period 2010-2011. The drop in total debt reflects a large decrease in credit from the pre-crisis primary bank and a smaller increase in credit from other banks, which implies that around half of the decrease in lending by exposed banks was neutralized by their customers borrowing more in other banks.
The relative decrease in the quantity of credit to customers in exposed banks was accompanied by a relative increase in the price of credit. In a sample of newly issued consumer loans where we can infer that loan terms are comparable, we document a differential increase in the effective interest rate of around 0.75 percentage point in [2008] [2009] . The finding that price and quantity moved in opposite directions is consistent with a shift in supply, but not with a shift in demand.
We also present evidence suggesting that the tightening of credit imposed effective borrowing constraints on some households. Most employees in Denmark have a tax favored pension savings account funded by mandatory employer contributions, however, a steep penalty for liquidation makes this an undesirable source of liquidity for individuals with access to credit. We show that the propensity to liquidate pension accounts increased significantly for customers in exposed banks relative to customers in non-exposed banks during the crisis. Although the absolute number of liquidations remained modest, the result is suggestive that customers in exposed banks were more likely to experience severe borrowing constraints.
The second set of results shows that the decrease in borrowing was accompanied by a significant decrease in consumption. The annual spending of customers in exposed banks decreased by almost DKK 8,500 (USD 1,400) relative to customers in nonexposed banks between 2007 and 2009. Part of this effect reflects a decrease in spending on real estate: customers in exposed banks bought smaller and less expensive houses relative to customers in non-exposed banks. But other consumption margins adjusted too: customers in exposed banks became less likely to be car owners and less likely to own multiple cars relative to customers in non-exposed banks.
Since spending decisions in different time periods are tied together by the intertemporal budget constraint, we should expect a relatively low level of spending during the crisis to be matched by a relatively high level of spending in later years. We find that customers in exposed banks returned to the spending path of customers in non-exposed banks in the post-crisis years 2010-2011; however, we find no evidence that they recovered any of the spending foregone during the crisis. This may reflect that the credit supply of exposed banks remained low after the crisis or, alternatively, that consumption did not adjust flexibly to a normalization of the credit supply. Concretely, to the extent that households acquired less expensive homes and cars during the crisis because of a low credit supply, habit and transaction costs may have prevented them from adjusting these consumption margins as the credit supply normalized.
The final set of results suggests that the effects of the credit supply shock were heterogeneous across customers in exposed banks with those holding less liquidity at the eve of the crisis being more adversely affected. While the differential decrease in total debt after 2007 was large and persistent within the bottom quintile of pre-crisis liquidity, it was small and temporary within the top quintile. Consistent with these results, we find a negative effect on spending within the bottom quintile of liquidity in every year of the crisis and post-crisis period, but no clear evidence that spending within the top quintile was affected at all.
While our empirical results are difficult to reconcile with theoretical models of frictionless banking markets, they are consistent with different types of frictions: a cost of switching banks on the customer-side (Klemperer, 1987) , which makes some individuals stay with their existing bank even when they could have obtained better credit outcomes in other banks, and imperfect information on the bank-side, which creates ex ante uncertainty about default probabilities (Sharpe, 1990 ) and deters banks from lending to new customers. Both frictions imply that customers in exposed banks on average obtain less credit than they would have as customers in non-exposed banks.
In practice, it is improbable that imperfect information plays a major role in the Danish market for consumer loans: households have relatively simple balance sheets and banks have access to comprehensive information about the income and credit histories of potential customers. It seems more likely that the relevant friction is on the customer-side, which is consistent with recent evidence that households make costly mistakes in loan markets. For instance, it has been shown in the U.S. context that shopping from too few mortgage brokers costs the average borrower around $1,000 (Woodward & Hall, 2012) and that the frequently observed failure to refinance mortgage loans entails costs of around $11,500 in present value terms (Keys et al., 2016) .
The main contribution of the paper is to enhance our understanding of the sharp decrease in household consumption that often follows a financial crisis. Existing studies emphasize the role of excessive leverage (Mian & Sufi, 2010) , falling house prices (Mian et al., 2013) and increased uncertainty (Alan et al., 2012) whereas our analysis points to a complementary channel through the contracted credit supply of distressed banks.
The existing literature linking financial crises to household outcomes through the credit supply channel is small and has produced mixed results. Two papers show that banks with high exposure to the 2007-2008 financial crisis reduced their lending to households in its aftermath (Ramcharan et al., 2015; Puri et al., 2011) . While these findings suggest that the credit supply channel contributed to the drop in consumer demand for housing and automobiles after the financial crisis, the papers only consider bank-level outcomes and therefore cannot determine whether customers in exposed banks were able to compensate with borrowing from other sources and thus ultimately maintain their desired level of consumption. One paper addresses this issue by combining bank and household survey data from Canada and concludes that the financial crisis had no effect on household consumption through the credit supply channel (Damar et al., 2014) .
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While our measure of spending is not directly comparable to the notion of private consumption in national accounts, the estimated effect on spending suggests
1 The credit supply channel is more thoroughly documented in the context of firms. A number of papers demonstrate that firms' borrowing decreases when their bank relation is in distress (Khwaja & Mian, 2008; Jiménez et al., 2014) and point to real effects in terms of reduced investment (Klein et al., 2002; Dwenger et al., 2015) and employment (Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Bentolila et al., 2015) .
that credit supply was a quantitatively important factor in the collapse of household consumption after the financial crisis. To illustrate, the estimates imply that being a customer in a bank exposed to the crisis in 2007 lowered spending at the sample mean by more than 4% in 2009. Embedded in a general equilibrium framework, our micro estimates could help quantifying how financial shocks shape macro-economic outcomes.
The paper proceeds in the following way. Section 2 provides background information on the banking sector and the financial crisis in Denmark. Section 3 describes the data sources and reports summary statistics. Section 4 documents the differential credit supply shock. Section 5 discusses the empirical strategy. Sections 6-8 present the results concerning financial outcomes, consumption outcomes and heterogeneous effects respectively. Section 9 concludes.
Background

The Danish financial sector
The Danish financial sector counts more than 100 retail banks, however, the bank market is relatively concentrated: 4 systemically important banks account for the majority of all lending while the remaining banks are predominantly regional or local banks.
All banks in Denmark rely on information from both public and private sources to assess credit risk. First, there is an automated procedure for banks to obtain financial information about loan applicants directly from the tax authorities. With the consent of the applicants, banks can access data on income and debt from tax returns as well as information on arrears to the public sector. Second, banks universally acquire information on arrears to private creditors from commercial registers and credit scores (similar to FICO scores) are readily available from credit bureaus.
Based on the availability of hard information about loan applicants, it seems unlikely that informational barriers to bank switches should be larger in Denmark than in other developed countries. This is consistent with survey evidence that customer mobility in Denmark, while low in absolute terms, is high by international standards: 3.6% of Danish survey respondents formed a new primary bank relation in 2013 compared to 3.6% in the U.S., 2.5% in Germany, 2.4% in the U.K and only 1% in the Netherlands (Bain & Co, 2013) .
The most distinctive feature of the Danish financial sector is the important role played by specialized mortgage credit institutions. These institutions are much more regulated than retail banks. They are only allowed to lend with collateral in Danish real estate and the loan-asset ratio on their loans cannot exceed 80% at origination. Moreover, they must be fully funded with publicly traded bonds and are required to lend at the interest rate at which they borrow plus a fixed premium covering average credit risk.
While consumer and auto loans are typically granted by banks and never involve mortgage credit institutions, most real estate purchases are financed with credit from both sources: a senior loan from a mortgage credit institution up to the regulatory limit and a junior loan from a bank that finances the residual. This implies that banks are typically the marginal providers of mortgage credit to households and that the credit limit set by banks determines the total amount of mortgage credit available to their customers. We therefore focus on the role of banks' credit supply in shaping credit and consumption outcomes of households.
The financial crisis 2007-2008 and its aftermath
In the years before the global financial crisis in 2007-2008, the Danish economy was growing at a rapid pace, the real estate market was booming and banks expanded their lending substantially. Since lending grew much faster than deposits, some banks relied increasingly on international credit markets to finance their expansion, often through loans at short maturities IMF (2014).
While Danish banks generally had very limited exposure to the U.S. mortgagebacked securities that triggered the financial crisis, some banks reached dangerously low levels of liquidity when global markets for wholesale funding froze (Rangvid, 2013; Shin, 2009) . Between May and September 2008, the central bank therefore intervened several times to provide liquidity to the banking system and in October 2008, shortly after the collapse of Lehmann Brothers, the government was compelled to extend a two-year unlimited guarantee to all bank liabilities. Despite the massive efforts to sustain the financial sector, many banks were in serious distress: 15 banks were closed by the regulatory authorities between 2008 and 2011 and many others accepted mergers to avoid failure reducing the total number of licensed banks from 147 in 2007 to 113 in 2011 (Rangvid, 2013) .
A severe crisis in the real economy accompanied and aggravated the banking crisis. Between 2007 and 2009, real private consumption decreased by around 4%, real GDP by around 5%, real investment by around 18%, real housing prices by around 20% and stock prices by more than 40%. 2 It shows a rapid increase in both outcomes until the peak of the financial crisis in 2008 when the expansion of credit suddenly came to a halt and consumption dropped sharply. The timing is suggestive of a causal relationship: the credit expansion stopped in the first quarter of 2008 and consumption started falling a few quarters later. The goal of the paper is to investigate whether the decline in credit and consumption can be explained with a decrease in banks' credit supply.
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Data sources
The main data innovation of this paper is to establish a link between individuals and their bank relations from tax records. At the end of each year, financial institutions in Denmark report the balance of their customers' deposit and loan accounts to the tax authorities. The reports are compulsory and reliable since they are used for tax enforcement. We thus have a complete mapping of all loans and deposits with domestic financial institutions held by all individuals in Denmark.
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To the raw administrative records of the Danish tax authorities, we add comprehensive information about the individual account holders from a number of other administrative registers. This includes demographic information such as age, gender, education, home municipality and identity of children and parents; labor market information such as wage income, industry and unemployment spells; income and wealth information such as capital income, social transfers, value of stock portfolios and pension accounts; auto register information such as the weight and production year of each registered automobile; real estate register information such as the size and value of each registered property. We also add detailed balance sheet information about the reporting banks obtained from the Danish Central Bank.
In the resulting dataset, we thus observe the following information for all individuals resident in Denmark for the period 2003-2011: the balance of each of their loan and deposit accounts; balance sheet information about the bank in which the account is held; and comprehensive background information about individual account holders from government registers.
Imputed spending
One of our key outcomes is spending, which we impute from income and wealth variables. The main idea is that spending in a given period, by definition, equals disposable income minus the increase in net wealth. Hence, to the extent that disposable income and wealth can be measured precisely, it is possible to impute spending as:
spending it = disposable income it − (net wealth it − net wealth it−1 )
While several papers validate the imputed measure of spending by showing that it correlates strongly with survey measures of consumption (Browning & Leth-Petersen, 2003; Kreiner et al., 2014) , the imputation method also has limitations. Most importantly, an increase in stock prices tends to lower measured spending by creating an increase in net wealth that is not matched by an increase in disposable income (unless the capital gain is realized). Similarly, an increase in the market interest rate reduces the market value of fixed-rate mortgage loans, which increases net wealth and lowers measured spending. In both cases, the imputation method confounds changes in valuation of balance sheet components with true savings. By contrast, refinancing of mortgage loans, whereby one loan is replaced by another with the same market value, does not affect measured spending.
We address these measurement problems in the following ways. For stock owners, we use the evolution of the general stock market index to estimate the change in portfolio values that is induced by price changes and add it back into imputed spending. With this procedure, stock price changes do not lead to mismeasurement of spending for individuals who hold the market portfolio, but will cause it to be overestimated (underestimated) for individuals whose stock portfolio underperforms (overperforms) relative to the market portfolio. Additionally, we conduct robustness tests where all stock owners are excluded; in this sample there is clearly no valuation effect of stock prices on measured spending. Similarly, in other robustness tests, we exclude all owners of real estate; in this sample there is no valuation effect of market interest rates because borrowing for other purposes than real estate takes the form of variable-rate loans whose market value is independent of market interest rates.
It is natural to compare our imputed measure of spending to the measure of private consumption employed in national accounts. The main difference between the two measures is the way they treat owner-occupied housing. Our spending measure includes expenses related to purchases and renovation of real estate. Technically, this is achieved by omitting real estate from net wealth in the imputation of spending: when households purchase real estate or incur expenses related to renovation, this concept of net wealth decreases by the full amount of the expense, through a decrease in financial assets if financed with own funds or an increase in liabilities if financed with debt, and their imputed spending increases correspondingly.
4 By contrast, national accounts define consumption of owner-occupied housing as the market rent and ignore any cash spending. Despite this conceptual difference, the two measures are empirically very similar when aggregated to the population-level. As shown in Figure 2 , imputed spending grew slightly faster than private consumption before the financial crisis and dropped slightly more after, but both the level of the two measures and their trend over time are quite alike.
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Sample and summary statistics
Before conducting the empirical analysis, we restrict the sample in several ways. First, we remove self-employed individuals since it is generally not possible to separate borrowing for business and private purposes on the balance sheet of those operating a firm in their own name. Second, we restrict the sample to individuals between 20 and 50 years (in 2007) , which is the time in the life-cycle where credit plays the most important role in supporting spending. Third, we exclude individuals whose primary bank in 2007 failed during the period 2008-2011; since failed banks were typically absorbed by sound banks and all customer accounts were transferred in the process, such individuals received a fundamentally different treatment than customers in exposed but surviving banks. Finally, we study a 25% random sample of the resulting population for computational tractability. These restrictions leave us with a baseline sample of around 440,000 individuals, almost 3.5 million individual-years and more than 5.7 million individual-account-years.
Once the dataset is constructed, we define a unique primary bank for each individual in 2007 using the following procedure:
5 For individuals who only had one bank relation in 2007, this is their primary bank. For individuals who had multiple bank relations in 2007, but only had a loan in one of those banks, this is their primary bank. For individuals who had loans in multiple banks in 2007, the bank in which the loan balance was largest is their primary bank. For individuals who had no loans, but had deposits in multiple banks in 2007, the bank in which the deposit balance was largest is their primary bank. The procedure thus rests on the assumptions that loans provide a stronger bank relation than deposits and that bank relations are stronger the larger the account balance. Next, we order individuals according to the loan-deposits ratio of their primary bank in 2007 and split the sample at the median individual so that the number of individuals with exposed and non-exposed banks is approximately the same.
6 Table 1 reports pre-crisis summary statistics on the main variables used in the analysis for customers in banks with high and low ratios of loans to deposits separately. All variables measured in DKK are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the influence of extreme observations. The first column provides a sense of the demographic characteristics and financial situation of the individuals in our sample. Individuals were roughly equally distributed across the four education categories, around two thirds had a cohabitating partner and more than half had children. The average total income was around DKK 250,000 (USD 35,000) and the average disposable income after taxes and interest payments around DKK 200,000. Since the average imputed spending was around DKK 220,000, we can infer that the average individual reduced net wealth by around DKK 20,000 in 2007. The average level of debt was around DKK 500,000 (USD 70,000) implying a ratio of debt to income around 2, which is very high by international standards and higher than in, for instance, the U.S.
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The next columns serve to assess whether customers in exposed and non-exposed were different with respect to their pre-crisis observed characteristics and, hence, whether it is likely that divergence between the two groups in the crisis and postcrisis period was driven by differential credit demand shocks. This does not seem to be the case. Table 1 shows that customers in banks with high and low loan-deposit ratios were strikingly similar. None of the differences between variable means in the two samples are close to statistical significance. Hence, there are no signs of customer selection into exposed banks based on observable household characteristics.
Finally, the table illustrates the important role of specialized mortgage credit institutions: around one third of household loans in Denmark are from banks while the remaining two thirds is from mortgage credit institutions. Although our empirical strategy only exploits variation in the credit supply of banks, the significance of nonbank debt points to total debt as the main financial outcome of interest. Given the institutional framework explained in section 2.1, we expect loans from banks and mortgage credit institutions to be complements: since bank customers typically cannot increase the share of financing from mortgage credit institutions in response to a tightening of bank credit, they are likely to purchase less real estate, which reduces borrowing from both banks and mortgage credit institutions in absolute terms.
The differential credit supply shock
The main premise of our analysis is that banks with fewer deposits on the liability side of their balance sheet and more loans on the asset side, tightened their credit supply more in response to the financial crisis. This section provides two types of evidence, based on bank-level and account-level data respectively, in support of this premise. with a low loan-deposit ratio continued to expand lending, banks with a high loandeposit ratio reduced lending considerably in a sudden reversal of the trend in the previous years. Table 2 shows that the negative correlation between banks' pre-crisis loan-deposit ratio and subsequent growth in lending is statistically significant, regardless of whether the regressions are unweighted or weighted with bank size and whether the loan-deposit ratio is used as a continuous variable or transformed into a dummy variable indicating a loan-deposit ratio above the median. These results are in line with existing studies of bank lending during the financial crisis (Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010; Cornett et al., 2011) . [ Table 2 around here]
Bank-level analysis
Loan-level analysis
While the bank-level results are consistent with a differential credit supply shock, it cannot a priori be excluded that they are in fact driven by differential credit demand shocks; strictly speaking it could be customers' demand for credit that for one reason or the other correlated with banks' loan-deposit ratios rather than banks' supply of credit.
To cleanly establish the existence of a differential credit supply shock, we conduct an account-level analysis exploiting that individuals with loan accounts in multiple banks create within-individual variation in loan outcomes. Intuitively, if individuals with loan accounts in both exposed and non-exposed banks systematically became less likely to obtain new credit in exposed banks than in non-exposed banks after the financial crisis, this cannot be explained with changes in credit demand but must reflect a differential change in credit supply. Formally, we estimate the following account-level model:
The dependent variable newloan ibt indicates if individual i increased borrowing in bank b at time t; θ it represents individual-time fixed effects; Ω t is a vector of time dummies; and exposed b indicates if bank b had a loan-deposit ratio above the median in 2007. The model includes no covariates since individual characteristics are fully absorbed by the individual-time fixed effects. The parameter of interest φ, measures how much more likely it is that a new loan is taken out in an exposed bank than in a non-exposed banks when borrowers have loan accounts in both (measured relative to 2007). Since individual-year fixed effects absorb the credit demand of each individual at each point in time, any differential change in the likelihood of taking out new loans across banks with different exposure can be attributed to differential changes in the credit supply. This is an application of the within-estimator proposed by Khwaja & Mian (2008) . Figure 4 illustrates the results by plotting the estimated coefficients on the interactions between exposed and the year dummies (i.e. the elements in the vector φ). The coefficients for the years 2004-2006 are very close to zero, which implies that, in the sample of individuals with loan accounts in both exposed and non-exposed banks, the likelihood of increasing the loan balance in the former relative to the latter was constant throughout the pre-crisis period. The coefficient for 2009 is statistically significant and the point estimate implies that individuals in the sample, who increased the balance of any loan account, were 15 percentage points less likely to do so in an exposed bank than in a non-exposed bank. For 2010 and 2011, the point estimates are also negative, but not statistically significant. Overall, this suggests that the credit supply of banks exposed to the financial crisis decreased sharply relative to non-exposed banks in 2009 and plausibly remained lower throughout the post-crisis period.
[ Figure 4 around here]
While the analysis in this section provides clean evidence of a differential credit supply shock, the findings do not imply that customers in exposed banks were adversely affected; neither the bank-level or the account-level results exclude that the differential credit supply shock was neutralized by customers switching from exposed to non-exposed banks. For this reason, our main analysis studies outcomes at the individual level. This allows us to study the full effect of the differential credit supply shock on bank customers while taking into account substitution toward other sources of credit.
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Empirical strategy
The main aim of the empirical analysis is to estimate the effect of banks' credit supply on the credit and consumption outcomes of households. Our empirical strategy is to compare individuals, whose primary bank was exposed to the financial crisis and therefore reduced its credit supply, to individuals whose primary bank was less exposed. We implement this comparison with the following baseline model:
where outcome it is a financial or consumption outcome of individual i at time t; α i represents individual fixed effects; Ω t is a vector of time dummies (2007 is the omitted category); exposed i is a dummy variable indicating if the primary bank of individual i in 2007 had a loan-deposit ratio above the population median; and X i is a vector of characteristics of individual i in 2007.
The vector β contains the main coefficients of interest. For each year it measures the average change in the outcome variable relative to 2007 for individuals who were customers in exposed banks in 2007 over and above the average change over the same period for individuals who were customers in non-exposed banks. The baseline model thus yields difference-in-difference estimates of how the financial crisis affected households through the credit supply channel for each of the years 2008-2011.
For expositional simplicity, we sometimes employ a compact version of the model where outcomes are averaged within the periods 2005-2007 ("pre-crisis"), 2009 ("crisis") and 2010-2011 ("post-crisis") . With the dataset collapsed to only three time periods, the difference-in-difference estimates are expressed by the interaction terms exposed × crisis and exposed × post − crisis. Whenever we employ the compact model, we always report the results from the full baseline model in Table A1 in the Appendix.
The main methodological challenge is the possibility that credit demand shocks correlate with the credit supply shock. For instance, it may be that customers in exposed banks incidentally had educational backgrounds, lived in geographical regions or worked in industries that made them more affected by the crisis through other channels. Alternatively, they may have had different unobserved characteristics, such as risk attitudes or time preferences, which made them behave differently during the crisis. In either case, the credit demand shocks of individuals may have varied systematically with the exposure of their bank, which invalidates identification of the credit supply channel based on a simple comparison of customers in exposed and non-exposed banks. We address this identification issue in two ways.
First, the difference-in-difference estimates are conditional on a comprehensive set of controls. For each control variable, we include the value in 2007 as well as its interactions with year dummies. With this procedure we effectively identify the effect from a comparison of individuals with the same observed characteristics in 2007, of which some were customers in exposed banks and others were customers in nonexposed banks. The baseline model includes 161 covariates (all interacted with a full set of time dummies) that capture the following characteristics: gender (dummy for being a woman), age (dummies for each 1-year age group), education (dummies for short, medium and long education with no education as the omitted category), home ownership (dummy for owning real estate), children (dummy for having children), civil status (dummy for cohabitation with partner), student (dummy for being a student), unemployment (dummy for unemployment spells during [2006] [2007] , bank debt (dummies for the deciles of the bank debt distribution in 2007), income (dummies for the deciles of the income distribution in 2007), home municipality (dummy for each of 98 Danish municipalities), and industry (dummy for each of 9 occupation sectors).
Second, β allows us to assess directly whether customers in exposed and nonexposed banks followed similar trajectories in terms of borrowing and consumption over the period 2003-2007 conditional on observed characteristics. To the extent that trends in outcomes are parallel during a period where there were no major differential shocks to credit supply, it is at least suggestive that the unobserved characteristics shaping credit demand are roughly balanced across customers in the two types of banks.
While the baseline specifications use a dichotomous measure of bank exposure to the financial crisis, our results are generally very similar when we replace exposed with the loan-deposit ratio and thus use the variation in exposure within the groups of exposed and non-exposed banks. The core results with this specification are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix.
All point estimates are reported with standard errors clustered at the level of the primary bank in 2007. This conservative clustering strategy widens the standard errors considerably given that the baseline sample includes close to 3.5 million observations at the individual-year level, but only just over 100 banks.
Finally, it is important to bear in mind when interpreting the results that β measures the "partial equilibrium" effects of the credit supply shock in the sense that any general equilibrium effects are absorbed by the time dummies. For instance, to the extent that the credit supply shock induced customers in exposed banks to reduce spending and this, in turn, aggravated the economic crisis with adverse consequences for all households in the economy, these indirect effects would be included in γ and not in β. Relatedly, even banks with a low loan-deposit ratio may have tightened their credit supply because of the financial crisis, although to a lesser extent than banks with a high loan-deposit ratio, and this part of the credit supply channel is not included in β since the latter is identified from a comparison of customers in banks with a high and a low loan-deposit ratio. It should also be noted that we are effectively studying the dynamic responses to an initial impulse. Exposed and nonexposed banks had very different loan-deposit ratios before the crisis, but gradually became more similar as exposed banks reduced their lending. By contrast, customers in exposed and non-exposed banks were initially very similar, but gradually became more different as customers in exposed banks accumulated less debt and postponed desired spending.
Results: Financial outcomes
We first use the baseline model with individual fixed effects and a full set of controls to study the main financial outcome: total debt. Figure 5 plots the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms between the year dummies and the dummy variable indicating that the individual's primary bank in 2007 was exposed to the financial crisis (i.e. the elements in the vector β).
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For 2004-2006, the point estimates are almost precisely zero suggesting that the average total debt of customers in exposed and non-exposed banks grew at almost exactly the same speed before the financial crisis. For 2008-2011, the point estimates are below zero suggesting that the total debt of customers in exposed banks decreased relative to the total debt of customers in non-exposed banks after the financial crisis. Since debt is observed at the end of each year, the gradually decreasing point estimates of around DKK -4,000 for 2008, DKK -12,000 for 2009 and DKK -15,000 for 2010 imply that most of the divergence occurred in the course of 2009. All point estimates are statistically and economically significant: the difference-in-difference estimate for 2009 corresponds to around 2.4% of the average level of debt in 2007.
To study how the large set of controls shapes the results, we estimate the compact model while moving sequentially from a specification with no controls, which is essentially a raw comparison of average levels, to the specification will all controls. Column (1) in Table 3 implies that the average total debt was DKK 7,600 higher for customers in exposed banks than for customers in non-exposed banks in the pre-crisis years whereas it was DKK 6,100 lower at the peak of the crisis in 2009 (a difference-in-difference estimate of DKK -13,700) and DKK 9,900 lower after the crisis in 2010-2011 (a difference-in-difference estimate of DKK -17,500). To this most parsimonious specification, Column (2) adds individual covariates; Column (3) further adds municipality dummies and industry dummies and Column (4) finally adds individual fixed effects. In all specifications, the difference-in-difference estimate is virtually the same, but precision increases considerably as controls are introduced.
[ Table 3 around here]
We then present similar results for various bank debt outcomes. As shown in Column (5), customers in exposed banks decreased their total bank debt by around DKK 7,500 relative to customers in non-exposed banks through the crisis with almost the entire decrease occurring before the end of 2009. The estimated effects for bank debt are smaller than for total debt in absolute terms, which confirms our expectation that loans from banks and mortgage institutes are complements: a reduction in bank debt induced by tightened bank credit spills over on non-bank debt. Measured relative to the sample mean, however the estimated effect on bank debt is around 5%, which is more than twice as large the effect on total debt.
Further, as shown in Columns (6)- (7), the decrease in total bank debt can be decomposed into a decrease in debt at the bank that served as primary bank in 2007 of around DKK 14,800 and an increase in debt at other banks of around DKK 7,100. This suggests that customers in exposed banks neutralized roughly half of the differential credit supply by switching to other banks.
A comparison of Columns (4) and (5) shows that almost half of the decrease in total debt occurred in mortgage institutes. This implies that real estate debt accounts for a large part of the total effect and ultimately raises the question whether there was any effect on consumer debt. Since we cannot isolate consumer debt in our dataset, we apply the baseline model to a subsample of individuals whose entire debt must be consumer debt: "renters" who did not own real estate at any point during the sample period. As shown in Column (8), the estimated effect in this subsample is comparable to the estimated effect on bank debt in the full sample shown in Column (5). This documents that also consumer debt was significantly affected by the credit supply shock.
While it is consistent with a static and partial equilibrium model of the credit market that a reduction in the supply causes a decrease in the equilibrium quantity, the same model also predicts an increase in the equilibrium price. In the next step, we thus investigate whether interest rates changed differentially for customers in exposed and non-exposed banks through the crisis.
Since our dataset does not contain explicit information about loan terms, we compute the effective interest rate in the following way: interest rate t = interest paid t 0.5(loan balance t−1 + loan balance t )
The main source of error is that we only observe loan balances at the end of each year and therefore need to approximate the average loan balance in year t with the average of the loan balances at the end of year t − 1 and year t. This implicitly assumes that loan balances evolve linearly over the year.
To obtain a meaningful comparison of interest rates, it is crucial to account for other loan terms, for instance whether the loan is secured with collateral and whether the rate is variable or fixed. We therefore focus the analysis on a relatively small sample of newly issued loans where we can infer that other loan terms than the interest rate are comparable. Specifically, we include an individual in period t in the estimation sample if three conditions are met: (i) total borrowing is below DKK 1.000 in period t-1; (ii) total borrowing is above DKK 50.000 in period t ; (iii) the borrower owns no house and no car in period t. Since these borrowers did not own a house or a car at the time the loans were issued, the loans are likely to be unsecured consumer loans, which generally have variable interest rates and short maturities.
We validate the procedure by showing that the distribution of estimated interest rates is sensible ( Figure A2 in the Appendix) and that the average effective interest rate follows the trend of the monetary policy rate closely over time ( Figure A3 in the Appendix). We then apply the baseline model with the modification that individual fixed effects are not included so as not to restrict identification to the very small number of individuals who took out multiple loans satisfying the requirements listed above during the sample period. As shown in Figure 6 , the interest rates faced by customers in exposed and non-exposed followed a very similar trend through the precrisis period, but then diverged sharply in 2009 with customers in exposed banks experiencing a relative increase in interest rates of around 0.7 percentage points.
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Having established that the differential credit supply shock induced by the financial crisis affected credit outcomes in the household sector, we study a number of related financial outcomes in Table 4 . First, when access to credit is constrained, households may respond by running down financial assets to mitigate the effect on consumption (Damar et al., 2014) . As shown in Column (1)-(2), customers in exposed banks reduced the value of their bank deposits and stock portfolios only slightly relative to customers in non-exposed banks through the crisis: the combined decrease of DKK 1,200 is very modest relative to the corresponding decrease in debt of DKK 14,400 (from Table 3 , Column 4) and not statistically significant. However, as shown in Column (3), the small average effect on liquidity conceals that customers in exposed banks became more likely to reach low levels of liquidity: the probability of having liquidity below the 25th percentile increased by almost one percentage point during the crisis for customers in exposed banks relative to customers in non-exposed banks and the difference persisted through the post-crisis period.
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The finding that exposed banks reduced their credit supply and that their customers were unable to compensate fully with credit from other sources suggest that customers in exposed banks were more likely to become borrowing constrained. We study this proposition using withdrawals from tax favored pension savings accounts as an indicator of borrowing constraints. While such accounts are funded by mandatory employer contributions and thus available to most individuals in Denmark, a 60% penalty applying to liquidations before pension age makes it a very costly source of liquidity, which we expect households to use only when alternative sources of liquidity are exhausted.
9 Column (4) documents a relative increase of 0.16 percentage points in the propensity of customers in exposed banks to withdraw funds from tax favored pension savings accounts during the crisis falling slightly to 0.12 percentage points after the crisis. The former difference-in-difference estimate corresponds to around 5% at the sample mean and the latter around 4%. While the effect on average liquidity is bound to be small because of the low number of individuals who make withdrawals, the finding is suggestive that the weakening of banks after the financial crisis imposed relatively severe borrowing constraints on some households. Finally, we investigate whether the credit supply shock induced households to adjust their labor supply. The evidence is weak. Column (5) shows that the income of customers in exposed banks decreased by around DKK 200 between 2007 and 2009 relative to customers in non-exposed banks whereas Column (6) documents a differential drop in unemployment of around 0.07 percentage points over the same period. The point estimates are consistent with the notion that households with lower access to credit were more willing to stay employed, even at lower wages, however, the results are far from statistical significance.
Results: Consumption outcomes
We start the analysis of consumption outcomes by applying the full baseline model to our imputed measure of spending. As shown in Figure 7 , the estimated coefficients on the key interactions between exposed and the time dummies are small for the years [2004] [2005] [2006] suggesting that the spending of customers in exposed and nonexposed banks evolved similarly before the financial crisis. Coinciding with the crisis, however, there was a significant differential decrease in the spending of customers in exposed banks. Specifically, from 2007 to 2008, their spending fell by around DKK 4,500 relative to customers in non-exposed banks, and from 2008 to 2009 by an additional DKK 4,500. The difference-in-difference estimate for 2009 corresponds to around 4% of the average level of spending in 2007. After the crisis, the spending of customers in exposed banks gradually returned to the path of customers in nonexposed banks; however, there is no evidence that they recovered any of the spending that was foregone during the crisis.
[ Figure 7 around here] When comparing the results for spending and debt, it is important to bear in mind that the former is a flow whereas the latter is a stock. Households are able to have a higher level of spending in periods where their debt increases; hence, the results showing a temporary effect on the level of spending in 2008-2009 are consistent with the previous results showing a temporary effect on the growth of debt in the same period.
We proceed by addressing the concern that differential trends in imputed spending could potentially be driven by measurement error related to stock market gains and losses (explained in Section 3.2). As shown in Table 5 , the results are almost identical when estimated with the full sample (Column 1) and a subsample that excludes stock owners (Column 2). This suggests that measurement error in spending does not vary systematically with bank exposure. In both samples, we find that customers in exposed banks reduced spending by around DKK 8,500 during the crisis relative to customers in non-exposed banks without recovering the foregone spending in the post-crisis period.
[ Table 5 around here]
Next, we apply the model to the subsample of "renters", individuals who did not own real estate at any time during the sample period, in order to ascertain whether the credit supply contraction by banks exposed to the crisis only affected spending on real estate or also had an impact on consumer spending. As shown in Column (3), the differential decrease in spending in 2009 was around DKK 2,200 for "renters". This difference-in-difference estimate is only around 25% of the analogous estimate in the full sample, which partly reflects a difference in the timing of the spending effect. When cumulating the difference-in-difference estimates for 2008 and 2009 instead of focusing only on 2009, the effect in the sample of "renters" is DKK 5,100, or around 40% of the effect in the full sample (See Table A1 in the Appendix). The difference in timing is suggestive that the supply of consumer credit was tightened before the supply of mortgage credit.
In the following columns, we provide a quantitative analysis of the relationship between the borrowing and spending effects. Formally, we employ an instrumental variables framework where the dependent variable is the change in spending from 2006-2007 to 2008-2009 , the main explanatory variable is the change in borrowing from (the end of) 2007 to (the end of) 2009 and the instrument is an indicator of having an exposed primary bank in 2007. Thus, we are effectively asking how much spending decreases when a contraction of the credit supply causes borrowing to decrease by one unit. The first stage shows a relative decrease in borrowing of around DKK 11,600 (Column 4) and the second stage yields an estimate just below unity (Column 5). These results show that the magnitude of the spending effect is consistent with the magnitude of the borrowing effect: a unit decrease in borrowing translates into almost exactly a unit decrease in spending.
The parameter identified by the instrumental variables framework could be labelled the marginal propensity to spend out of borrowing. This is a very different concept than the marginal propensity to consume out of liquidity (Gross and Souleles, 2002) : while the latter measures how household consumption responds to changes in borrowing opportunities, the former captures how spending varies with actual borrowing.
It is interesting to note that the marginal propensity to spend out of borrowing expresses whether own funds and borrowed funds are substitutes or complements in household spending decisions. On the one hand, if households make purchases with their own funds instead of borrowed funds when credit is restricted, the parameter is smaller than unity. On the other hand, if households refrain from making purchases that would have been financed with a mix of own and borrowed funds when credit is restricted, the parameter is larger than unity. Our empirical results suggest that, on average across the consumers affected by the credit supply shock, borrowing is neither a substitute nor a complement to own funds.
Next, we document consumption responses to the credit supply shock using information from an entirely unrelated source: the auto register. Column (6) shows that customers in exposed banks exhibited a relative decrease in the propensity to own a car of around 0.003 during the crisis. This suggests that 1 out of roughly 330 customers in exposed banks did not own a car while they would have owned one, had they been customers in non-exposed banks. In addition, Column (7) shows that the propensity to own two cars or more decreased by 0.0014 during the crisis suggesting that 1 out of roughly 700 customers in exposed banks owned at most one car whereby they would have owned at least two cars, had they been customers in non-exposed banks. The effect on the stock of cars persists but does not increase further in the post-crisis period.
Finally, we report results relating to real estate spending in Table 6 . Column (1) shows that the average public property valuation of real estate owned by customers in exposed banks decreased by around DKK 9,500 relative to customers in non-exposed banks during the crisis and remained lower through the post-crisis years. This suggests that households with a demand for better housing were more likely to either remain in their existing home or acquire a less expensive home than desired if they were customers in exposed banks.
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We study each of these two channels in turn. First, as shown in Column (2), we find that customers in exposed banks exhibited a small and statistically insignificant decrease in the propensity to purchase real estate of around 0.06% during the crisis relative to customers in non-exposed banks. Second, we estimate the effect on the characteristics of newly acquired real estate by restricting the sample to individualyears where a real estate purchase takes place. Compared to the full baseline model, we drop individual fixed effects to avoid restricting the identifying variation to the limited number of individuals who buy several homes during the sample period, but retain all other controls. Column (3) shows that the increase in the public property valuation triggered by a real estate transaction fell by around DKK 64,000 for customers in exposed banks relative to customers in non-exposed banks during the crisis. Consistent with the findings for imputed spending, the difference between the two groups in this measure of real estate spending largely vanished after the crisis. Similarly, there was a differential decrease in the average new debt of around DKK 46,000 (Column 4) and a differential decrease in the gain in home size of around 1.1 square meters (Column 5) for customers in exposed banks purchasing real estate during the crisis. These results are strongly suggestive that customers in exposed banks were induced to buy smaller and less valuable homes when their banks tightened credit in response to the financial crisis.
Results: Heterogeneous effects
It should be expected that the effect of a credit supply shock on household borrowing and spending differs across household with different ex ante levels of liquidity. First, liquid households presumably have a lower credit demand; it is not obvious why they would finance purchases with debt if they could pay for them with their own liquid funds. Second, when liquid households demand credit to make purchases that exceed their own liquidity, for instance a house, banks' credit risk, and thus the informational barrier to lending, should be lower given the households' ability to co-finance with own funds.
In this section, we estimate the effect of being a customer in an exposed bank on credit and consumption outcomes at different ex ante levels of liquidity. Specifically, we split the sample into five liquidity quintiles based on the distribution immediately before the crisis and estimate the baseline model separately for the bottom 20%, the middle 60% and the top 20% of liquidity. Individuals in the bottom quintile held liquidity of less than DKK XXX whereas the top quintile held liquidity in excess of DKK XXX. By comparison, the average monthly income in 2007 was around DKK XXX. Figure 8A illustrates the results for total debt. Within the bottom decile of liquidity, the debt of customers in exposed banks decreased quickly relative to customers in non-exposed banks and the divergence continued throughout the sample period; the difference-in-differences estimate for 2011 was around DKK -20,000. Within the top decile of liquidity, the divergence was slower and there are signs of a reversal at the end of the sample period; the effect was largest in 2010 at around DKK -10,000 and dropped to a statistically insignificant DKK -5,900 in 2011. In every year, the estimated decrease in borrowing within the middle quintiles falls between the estimates for the top and bottom quintiles. Figure 8B illustrates the analogous results for spending. Within the bottom decile of liquidity, customers in exposed banks reduced spending immediately after the crisis relative to customers in non-exposed banks and the difference-in-differences estimates remain negative and statistically significant during the post-crisis years. Within the top decile of liquidity, the difference-in-differences estimate is only negative for 2009 and always far from statistical significance. Again, the estimated effects vary monotonically with liquidity in every year.
[ Figure 8 around here]
The results should be interpreted with caution for at least two reasons. First, although the point estimates strongly suggest that ex ante liquidity plays an important role in determining the effect of the credit supply shock, the precision of the estimates is generally low and the differences between liquidity groups are not statistically significant. Second, it is conceivable that the consistent differences across liquidity groups are not caused by liquidity itself but by other household characteristics, observable or unobservable, that correlate with liquidity.
Conclusion
This paper has studied whether the financial crisis spread from distressed banks to households through a contraction of the credit supply. We first argued that banks with a large reliance on non-deposit funding and many assets tied up in illiquid loans were especially exposed to the global credit crunch associated with the financial crisis in [2007] [2008] and documented that banks with a high loan-deposit ratio in 2007 reduced their credit supply significantly in the following years relative to banks with a low loans to deposits ratio. We then showed that customers in exposed banks reduced their total borrowing as well as consumption after the financial crisis relative to customers in non-exposed banks suggesting that the tightening of credit by banks exposed to the crisis had significant adverse effects on the households that were their customers. Note: Table 1 reports means and standard deviations of personal characteristics in 2007 for all individuals (Column 1) and individuals whose primary bank in 2007 had a Loan-to-Deposit ratio above the median (Column 2) and below the median (Column 3) respectively; the difference between the means in the two subsamples (Column 4); the ratio of the two means (Column 5) and the p-value of a test of identical means (Column 6). All variables measured in DKK are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. (1) and (3), the explanatory variable is a dummy indicating that the ratio of loans to deposits was above the median at the end of 2007. In columns (2) and (4), the explanatory variable is the ratio of loans to deposits at the end of 2007. In columns (1)- (2), the regressions are unweighted ordinary least squares whereas in columns (3)- (4) 
Total debt Debt in banks
Note: Table 3 Table 4 Table 5 reports estimates from the compact baseline model with individual-level outcomes: imputed spending (Columns 1-3), an indicator of owning a car (Column 6), an indicator of owning more than one car (Column 7). These outcomes are averaged within the time periods 2005 -2007 (Pre-crisis ), 2009 (Crisis ) and 2010 and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile in each time period. Table 5 
Outcomes conditional on purchase
Note: Table 5 reports estimates from the compact baseline model with individual-level outcomes: total appraisal value of real estate (Column 1) and an indicator of purchasing real estate (Column 2). These outcomes are averaged within the time periods 2005 -2007 (Pre-crisis ), 2009 (Crisis ) and 2010 and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. The regressions use the full sample of individual-period observations. Table 5 also reports estimates from a modified model with individual-level outcomes: the change in the total appraisal value of real estate (Column 3), the change in total debt (Column 4) and the change in the habitable surface of real estate (Column 5). These outcomes are not averaged within periods. The regressions use the sample of individual-year observations where a real estate purchase takes place. Note: Figure 4 illustrates the results from the account-level model with individual-time fixed effects where the dependent variable is a dummy indicating an increase in the loan balance relative to the previous year. The black dots represent the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms between time dummies and a dummy for banks that were exposed to the financial crisis. The gray bars represent 95% confidence intervals of the point estimates.
Precise point estimates and standard errors are reported in Table A3 in the Appendix. Table A3 in the Appendix.
Note: Figure 6 illustrates the results from the baseline model where the dependent variable is the effective interest rate as defined in the main text. The black dots represent the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms between time dummies and a dummy for individuals whose primary bank in 2007 was exposed to the financial crisis. The gray bars represent 95% confidence intervals of the point estimates. The model includes individual characteristics, industry dummies and municipality dummies, all measured in 2007 and interacted with a full set of time dummies, as well as individual fixed effects. Precise point estimates and standard errors are reported in Table  A3 in the Appendix. Table A3 in the Appendix. Table 5 -consumption  Table 6 -real estate Note: Table A1 reports estimates from the fully dynamic baseline model with the following outcomes: imputed spending (Columns 1-2), an indicator of owning car (Column 3), an indicator of owning more than one car (Column 4), total appraisal value of real estate (Column 5) an indicator of purchasing real estate (Column 6), the change in the total appraisal value of real estate (Column 7), the change in total debt (Column 8) and the change in the habitable surface of real estate (Column 9). The regressions use the full sample (Columns 3-6), the subsample who did not hold shares (Column 1), the subsample who did not own real estate at any time during the period 2003-2011 (Colum 2) and the subsample where a real estate purchase took place (Columns 7-9). Exposed indicates that the Loans-to-Deposits ratio of the individual's primary bank in 2007 was above the sample median. Covariates include categorical controls, all measured in 2007, for age, educational level, gender, home ownership, partner, unemployment spells during past 24 months, deciles of bank debt, deciles of income. Municipality fixed effects are indicators for each of the 98 municipalities and industry fixed effects indicators for 9 occupational industries. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistically different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Table A2 reports estimates from the fully dynamic baseline model with the following outcomes: total debt (Column 1), imputed spending (Column 2), an indicator of withdrawals from tax favored pension accounts (Column 3), an indicator of owning a car (Column 4) and the total appraisal value of real estate (Column 5). The regressions use the full sample. Exposure indicates the Loans-to-Deposits ratio of the individual's primary bank in 2007. All outcomes and Exposure are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Covariates include categorical controls, all measured in 2007, for age, educational level, gender, home ownership, partner, unemployment spells during past 24 months, deciles of bank debt, deciles of income. Municipality fixed effects are indicators for each of the 98 municipalities and industry fixed effects indicators for 9 occupational industries. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistically different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Figure A1 shows the mean ratio of loan to deposits for exposed and non-exposed banks respectively over the period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] Note: Figure A2 shows the distribution of effective interest rates as defined in the main text. The distribution is censored at 2% and 20%. Note: Figure A3 shows the evolution of the mean effective interest rate as defined in the main text and the policy monetary interest rate over the period 2004-2011. 
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